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In the fall of 1987, one of the most significant affairs in recent intellectual
history erupted in France when the unknown Chilean writer Victor
Farias published a well-researched but philosophically unimpressive
book on Martin Heidegger’s Nazism. To publishers abroad, notably in
Germany, the volume rang a hollow bell, and remained unprinted, as
debates on existentialism, Heidegger’s engagement with the Nazi party,
and his continuing political position in the fifties lay in the past.1 But in
France, despite a certain academic awareness of  Heidegger’s Nazi
engagement, the effect was very different:2 Farias struck a nerve, and
suddenly the intellectual milieu erupted into furious polemics. This
1987 Heidegger Affair has long been read as the final curtain for a
movement that lent support to several epistemological ruptures in
French philosophy (according to some of  the more positive accounts)
or flourished as an uncritical and pretentious audience for Heidegger
(in the less generous ones). Yet although it provided a number of  signs
indicating shifts in intellectual tendencies, the affair has never been
seriously treated as a barometer for the recent past of  French thought.3
The present essay attempts to offer a necessarily schematic intellectual-
historical description of  the 1987 affair as an intellectual event emerging
with the rise of  a neo-humanist politics that came with the “French
Philosophy of  the Eighties,” concentrating on its treatment of  a politico-
philosophical legacy whose importance and political ambiguities
continue to the present day.4
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Following Heidegger’s death in 1976, as well as the death of
his prime French “angel” Jean Beaufret in 1982, the master’s thought
became officially consecrated in France as one of  the main pillars of
“French” philosophy in the twentieth century.5 Work on Heidegger
expanded during the 1980s: studies of  his work both increased
numerically and defined fields (e.g. comparative literature) that it had
so far not broadly penetrated. French high-school students read
Heidegger for the baccalauréat philosophy examination.6 But at the same
time, orthodox Heideggerianism took a downward turn, losing its
centrality among possible interpretations of  Heidegger and of  the
history of  philosophy. For a long time, close Heideggerians such as
Beaufret, François Fédier, Dominique Janicaud, François Vezin,
Emmanuel Martineau, Jean-Michel Palmier, and Frederic de Towarnicki
had formed a significant philosophical avant-garde, influencing “every
philosopher from… Cornelius Castoriadis to Michel Foucault,”7 and
participating in movements from deconstruction to Bourdieu’s
sociology. Yet by the time of  Beaufret’s death in 1982—indeed since
much earlier—the novelty of  their work had waned, and defections to
other philosophical camps were building up. Orthodox Heideggerianism
incorporated none of  the substantive philosophical “innovations” since
the 1960s, not even those by philosophers deeply influenced by
Heidegger—Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, late
Marxism (Jean-François Lyotard, Kostas Axelos, et al), or the nouveaux
philosophes. Orthodox Heideggerianism also evaded political challenges
that the intellectual realm became much involved in—from the end of
French colonialism to May ‘68 and the 1980s turn toward liberal
humanism—instead maintaining its appropriately anti-political character.
As a result, the fading of  the orthodox group was not seriously noticed
until the famous political controversy ignited by Farias’ livre-provocateur,
Heidegger et le nazisme.8 The unprecedented immediacy of  the 1987 debate
should be understood, with regard to this decline in Heideggerian
orthodoxy and the change in perceptions of  humanism, as a
battleground for the perception of  the human rights discourse directed
principally—but not solely—against communism and the intellectual
left, and a precursor to recent debates about multiculturalism and
religion.
Decline and Fall of  the Heideggerian Empire
For France, the eighties were a period of  debates regarding
not only the legacy of  Vichy but also the incorporation and subversion
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of  the post-1945 non-democratic movements into the mainstream.
The presidency of  François Mitterand marked an end to an era, a
major—alternatively the last—moment for the postwar left. His election
brought in a different way of  reading contemporary French history,
one that was supported by the recent work of  historians such as François
Furet and that was no longer dependent on the political oppositions
of  the early Cold War and the end of  the colonial era.9 It helped heal a
society deeply divided between political left and right and partook more
extensively than previous decades in a reconsideration of  the century’s
political legacies. This makeover is evident in the intellectual and public
tensions and squabbles over topics that to outsiders might seem trivial
or outdated. In particular, the implication of  individuals and groups
with Nazism (coming with the ascent of  the Front National) was a major
cause of  public debate, indeed one that matched in ferocity similar
debates in Germany and Austria.10 In 1987, the Heidegger Affair was
preceded by at least three major affairs concerning Nazism and the
Vichy legacy. Their precedent fueled a remarkable (if, given the
circumstances, not too surprising) fury in the French media over
Heidegger and recent French philosophical politics. Though not all
changes that the debate initiated in the public and philosophical realm
became immediately noticeable, a confrontation between different
camps of  French thinkers produced a difficult and deeply tense moment
that evidenced deep fractures in French thought.
Marked changes in the approach to Heidegger had taken place
from much earlier. As already mentioned, Heidegger’s thought and
legacy had achieved a certain canonization by the mid-1970s. At the
same time, this canonization gradually escaped the traditional control
of  French Heideggerians around Beaufret. One of  the major events
or instances of  this canonization was the dedication of  the 1983 Cahier
de l’Herne to Heidegger.11 But unlike what one would expect, at the
helm of  the massive volume was not a Beaufret student or friend, but
Michel Haar, who as a young philosopher in the mid-70s had expressed
his dissatisfaction with Beaufret’s translations and presentation of
Heidegger. Haar had sent all this in a letter to Heidegger,12 a letter co-
signed by, among others, Alain Renaut (who soon thereafter broke
completely with Heideggerianism of  any sort), Roger Munier (a personal
friend of  Heidegger’s and early translator of  his “Letter on Humanism”),
and Henri Birault (one of  Heidegger’s most important early French
readers, who had originally praised Beaufret unconditionally).13
Responding in public, Beaufret scoffed at the letter and indicated that
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Heidegger held its authors in no greater respect than he himself  did.
Yet this letter marked a first challenge to Beaufret’s position of  proximity
to Heidegger and competence in vetting the quality and “propriety” of
writings on him in France. A bibliography of  French Heidegger studies
in the Cahier demonstrated, for the first time, how few the publications
of  the orthodox group had been and even that Beaufret had published
almost nothing on Heidegger during his 1950s heyday. Indeed, orthodox
disciples produced none of  the original work included in the Cahier.
Another public tribute to Heidegger in Magazine Litteraire further rejected
Beaufret’s denunciations of  the unorthodox, recognizing the
significance of  work by individuals outside his coterie.14 Participation
by orthodox Heideggerians at colloquia by non-Heideggerians became
negligible. For example, a March 1987 conference on Heidegger at the
College International de Philosophie included work by such figures as Jacques
Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas and Giorgio Agamben, and younger
philosophers like Françoise Dastur, but none by thinkers close to
Beaufret.15
Such work was indicative of  the turn the Heidegger legacy
had taken, as “Heidegger” became better developed by strands of
French phenomenological and post-phenomenological (but not strictly
Heideggerian) thought. Heideggerians themselves experienced tensions
after Beaufret’s death.16 Even the posthumous publication of  Beaufret’s
final Dialogue avec Heidegger IV offered no alternative to this decline:
unlike the first three volumes, whose organization had been thematic,
this volume included no unpublished texts or “pioneering” studies
(the only unpublished text therein was anticipating publication in a
volume on Lacan). The essays themselves were not of  the level of
Beaufret’s earlier work, and suggested that he had largely run his course.
Still worse, Beaufret’s friends, though important, had never been that
many. His 1950s feud with Wahl, whom Beaufret apparently blamed
for blocking his doctorate—hence barring him from a university carreer
(HF 1:176-81, 2:108)—culminated toward the end of  his life in a bitter
distance from French intellectual life, especially the intellectual left to
which he had belonged in the 1940s.17 Disciples were hampered with
these legacies, a point that had hurt their own reputation well before
1987.
Representation
Indeed, the only new orthodox Heideggerian contribution
of  significance was the full translation of  Sein und Zeit, by now well
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over half  a century late, directed by François Vezin.18 Vezin had been
particularly close to Beaufret, who on behalf  of  Heidegger’s family
had “authorized” him in the late 1970s to translate Sein und Zeit in its
entirety, following from the translation of  Division I by Alphonse de
Waelhens and Walter Boehm in 1964.19 Etre et Temps, which completed
a translation contract over five years old (and a project over four decades
old), erupted into a debate with a competing, “unauthorized” recent
publication of  the project by Emmanuel Martineau.20 Martineau, a
normalien and faithful student of  Beaufret, had undertaken the project
on his own, probably after Beaufret’s death.21  The attempt by Vezin
and Beaufret’s other protégé François Fédier, to proclaim this translation
inferior to the “authorized” one met with little support.22 The debate
concerned adequacy of  terms—which had been important for the
legitimacy of  orthodox Heideggerians since the 1940s rejection of
Corbin’s translation of  Dasein as réalité humaine, and which had become
a problem ever since the first critiques of  their choices in the 60s debate
in Critique.23 Yet this time, “adequacy of  terms” referred to the
obfuscating translation slang that, according to critics, plagued Vezin’s
translation, and quickly brought a community of  translators to crisis.
Martineau boasted his translation as unauthorized, responding that Vezin’s
“horribly inadequate” German had led him to render Sein und Zeit in an
intentionally obtuse fashion.24 The scorn poured on Vezin by other
translators—Lacoue-Labarthe, Janicaud, Haar, and Roger Munier
among them—was often even more biting.25 Vezin had one strong
card to play and he played it well, concentrating on the fact that Beaufret
(and, through him, the Heidegger family) had trusted him with the
translation: his master had known better. But the turn to Heidegger
and Beaufret themselves did not work, precisely because detractors
were better placed institutionally, and also because few people outside
a rather small circle cared much for the translations. Leaving a public
“to judge,” the conflict further lessened the image of  Heideggerianism
to a culture of  self-congratulatory denunciation. A similar clash followed
the 1984 publication of  Questions II when François Châtelet, who in
the 60s had participated favorably in discussions on the relationship
between Heidegger and Marx, published a strongly-worded negative
review.26 Châtelet blamed translators for an anachronistic ordeal, waxing
lyrically about the 1955 Cérisy conference on Heidegger and the
openness of  1950s Heideggerianism.27 From the perspective of
phenomenology, Châtelet wasn’t altogether unfair: during the 1950s,
the study of  Heidegger was associated with Beaufret on the one hand,
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but also with less orthodox and better established readers (and critics)
like Jean Wahl and especially Jean Hyppolite, not to mention others
like Levinas.
Moreover, thought influenced “second-hand” by Heidegger
(and thought influenced in a less orthodox fashion by Heidegger, e.g.
as studied under Wahl or Hyppolite) started renouncing its respect for
the Heideggerian utopias and pedestals. Jacques Derrida, who had long
expressed significant distances from Heidegger,28 and whose Heidegger
depended as much on a reading of  Husserl as on a reading of  Levinas,
offered a major critique in 1983, when he lectured on sexual and
ontological difference.29 Taking up the problem of  the non-distinction
between the sexes in Heidegger’s Dasein, Derrida indicted Heidegger
for failing to address the difference between the sexes as ontological,30
thus leveling basic distinctions in a manner that contributed to the
gender hierarchization of  Being. Dasein was insufficient in thinking
difference between separate subjects, and reduced such subjects to a
single model; for Derrida, it required at least “considerable adjustments.”
Derrida’s critique of  Dasein (which in one sense at least pushes toward
a division that is at least as radical (if  not considerably more so) than
his earlier critiques of finitude and historicity) parallels the path that
French phenomenological and post-phenomenological thought had
taken, taking over and moving past Heidegger’s anti-subjectivism. After
thirty years of  philosophical questionings of  the unity and dependences
of  the subject by thinkers like Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault and Levinas,
Heidegger’s position was surpassed. In this context, an elaboration of
differences Derrida saw as inherent in ontology (and whose
anthropologization by Heidegger he found insufficient, if  ontology
was to retain any sort of  primordial status) was necessary as reaching
the root of  Heidegger’s Dasein altogether.
Other concrete philosophical distantiations by Heidegger’s
children had begun from the mid 1960s, most notably in the work of
Pierre Bourdieu and Emmanuel Levinas. It is difficult to trace the origins
of  the critique of  Heideggerian thought, because it can be read as
stemming from several categories: works not influenced by Heidegger;
works who disagree with his most basic tenets; works influenced by
but rejecting Heidegger; and so on. Nevertheless, we can today point
to certain texts that initiated the undermining of  the French
Heideggerian reading of  Heidegger and perhaps the rejection of  much
of  his thought. In 1975, Bourdieu published a long article, “L’Ontologie
Politique de Martin Heidegger,” in one of  the first issues of  his journal
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Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales.31 In it, he used Heidegger-inspired
discursive analysis without granting immunity from such analyses to
Heidegger himself. Bourdieu carefully located Heidegger in a
conservative discourse where conservative academics “provided an
objectification which echoed his own politico-moral views.”32 The
political analysis shows clear connections to Karl Löwith’s 1946 “The
Political Implications of  Heidegger’s Existentialism,”33 not least in its
attempt to situate Heidegger’s work in his political-intellectual
environment, but Bourdieu’s theoretical framework was heavily
influenced by recent developments, like Foucault’s discursive analysis
and Jean-Pierre Faye’s Langages Totalitaires. Bourdieu opposed granting
the status of  pure, socially unaffected approaches to philosophy, and
the sanitized Heidegger of  the French 1960s provided him with an
ideal case for a critique that would explain the distinction and
connections between the “internal” (lexical and argumentative) and
“external” (discursive, historical, political) aspects of  a text. 34
In a different realm, Levinas’ well-known work had from the
late 1940s on highlighted and challenged the ethical inadequacy of
Heidegger’s allegedly pure ontology.35 Levinas saw Heidegger as essential
to contemporary thought and repeatedly affirmed his own dependence
on him.36 Yet his objections to Heidegger were not merely numerous
and significant, they spanned his entire oeuvre, from the 1935 “De
l’evasion” through the il y a motif  he developed in the 1940s and his
turn toward an otherwise than being in the 1960s.37 Levinas insisted on
irreducible boundaries between subjects, striking a blow at the
“universally-shared” subjectivity of  Dasein. Subjects do not flow into
each other, as the latter would suggest, and hence Being is exteriority
insofar as it denotes this separation and contrast (TI 290): one has to
move beyond the brute factuality of  Being (OE 54-5) for an ethical
relation to occur (TI 301-2). Levinas further rejected the
institutionalization of  Heideggerian antihumanism in the human
sciences (Foucault), seeing antihumanism as tantamount to a reduction
of  identity to equality, and as constitutive of  a self-difference that served
the dispersal and self-distancing of the subject.38 Without an ethical
understanding of  the Other through a face-to-face relation, Being was
condemned to incompleteness and permeated by barbarity (TI 291,
OE 73). Retaining certain basics of  Heideggerian Dasein, Levinas came
to a new philosophical foundation, expressing both a revulsion toward
Heidegger’s postwar silence and a distrust of  his mystification of  Being.39
Every contemporary thinker, he noted, owes to Heidegger “a debt one
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often regrets.”40 The significance of  Levinas was such for readers like
Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida as to completely
re-shape the Heidegger legacy and push away from the primacy of
ontology.
What these changes meant is that the Heideggerian meta-
Greek Elysian Fields of  philosophical exchange—which claimed
philosophical authenticity for itself  and was echoed in French heroic
philoclassicism41 (which even Derrida had been charged with abiding
by42)—was no longer sustainable. In the famous 1960s seminars at
René Char’s home, Heidegger and his interlocutors had adopted
Provence as the echo of  Classical Greece:
Here by the olive trees, which cling to the slope before us,
all the way down into the plain where, in the distance and
not yet visible, the Rhône flows, we start again… Behind
us lies the Delphic mountain massif... Whoever finds his way
there, is a guest of  the Gods.43
To a considerable degree, the self-fashioning of  orthodoxy depended
on such a Meta-Greece. As some offspring of  orthodox
Heideggerianism began to move away from their earlier loyalty, so began
the criticism of  such pedestals of  orthodoxy. Trust in such a Meta-
Greece qua home of  pure philosophical exchange declined as the
thinking of  democracy by prominent leftists like Castoriadis, Claude
Lefort and Pierre Vidal-Naquet came to demand a re-situating of  the
debt to classical Greece.44 Most prominently, Lacoue-Labarthe published
in 1981 an essay on Heidegger’s Rectoral Address that proceeded to
dismantle Meta-Greece, driving parallels between it and Heidegger’s
Rectorate.45 As Heidegger’s vision started to look like a pinnacle of
anti-modernism that failed to address contemporary philosophico-
political issues, his overall thought became more suspect.46
In the eighties there arose much more hostile strands of  anti-
Heideggerianism, notably in the writings of  Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut,
following from the 1970s movement of  the Nouveaux Philosophes. The
new philosophers’ vogue, oft-discussed and even well-documented on
television, combined with a general move away from the radicalism of
the early 70s and a new rise of  liberalism and a language of  rights. To
a substantial degree, the new philosophers also transformed the very
contours and possibilities of  the intellectual public, at once reaching
for a less-philosophically-educated audience and relating much more
comfortably to the mass media (Bernard-Henri Lévy is a famous
example). Yet the “new philosophers” did not target Heidegger and
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his disciples: André Glucksmann’s Master Thinkers treated Heidegger as
a pillar against contemporary radicalisms,47 while Lévy’s Grasset
collection Figures published a collection of  essays on Heidegger and
religion.48
The new philosophers’ work was echoed across the political
spectrum and heralded a humanistic renaissance. During the previous
three decades, and largely in opposition to the French Communist
Party, left antihumanism had developed a dual critique of  political
humanism and philosophical anthropocentrism as being tainted by the
very same battling ideologies that incessantly claimed and disgraced
humanism for their own causes. “Antihumanism” (a term mostly used
by its critics and pejoratively) largely claimed itself  to be a deeper sort
of  humanism that was opposed to humanisms, that decentered “man”
and thus returned to man his fundamental dignity. Its claim was,
especially if  we are to follow Jacques Derrida’s reading in “The Ends
of  Man,” to a deeper humanism unburdened by political problematics
and the violence of  ideals.49 Antihumanism was heavily influenced by
Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, Alexandre Kojeve’s reading of  Hegel,
Merleau-Ponty’s Humanism and Terror (and their failure) and Foucault’s
reading of  the human sciences, and was politically consistent with a
distinguishing of  France and its culture from the crushing pincers of
America and the USSR (a traditional German romantic theme famously
evoked by Heidegger with regard to Nazi Germany during the 1930s,
later invoked in France by Kojeve and de Gaulle).50 With structuralism’s
displacement of  the human subject and its value in domains of
signification, antihumanism completed its transformation into
epistemology51—that is, until the late 1970s finally succeeded in wresting
conceptions of  humanism away from the PCF’s claim to a humanism
of  universal equality. Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago,52
François Furet’s disillusioning work on the French Revolution,53 and
Castoriadis and Lefort’s work on autonomy, philosophically supported
novel readings of  the human condition, to a degree claiming for this
condition a less tension-ridden definition of  modernity than recent
intellectual predecessors would agree to. The rhetoric of  human rights
that then developed in the 1980s reduced antihumanism to simple
contempt for human life, while the nascent presidency of  François
Mitterand more or less ended the left’s search for alternative politics.54
The 1980s French neohumanists’ prime concern was a latter-
day “defense” of  liberal democracy and the legacy of  the Enlightenment
as these developed in the 19th century. This revival was carried out largely on
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the claim of  an ethical/political necessity, a “necessity” that was in many
ways radically opposed to the “necessity” permeating the ethical/political
thought of  Levinas and deconstruction.55 This discourse of  human
rights took as its basis certain tropes of  a “weight” and “content” of
man,56 not defining itself strictly as a politics but as a suprapolitical
intervention57 relying on Montesquieu (rather than Voltaire or Diderot),
primarily treating his work as a constructive juridicopolitical cradle for
modernity.58 The effort of  French “neohumanists” continued into the
1990s to treat subjectivity on grounds associated with the Enlightenment
so as to “avert” a “narcissistic individualism” that arrived with the
1960s.59 And as much of  the radical left and its aspirations were already
discredited (largely by the nouveaux philosophes, with whom the neo-
humanists had an ambivalent relationship), the attack against 1960s’
antihumanism came to undermine the philosophico-political legitimacy
of  (among others) the Heideggerian project, notably in the work of
Ferry and Renaut.
Ferry and Renaut’s 1984 book on contemporary antihumanism
centered specifically on French philosophers indebted to Heidegger—
whom it treated as bound to his thought and unoriginal on their own
account.60 Renaut was a disgruntled former student of  Beaufret and
had already rejected him by signing the aforementioned letter to
Heidegger that saw Beaufret as an obtuse misreader. By 1984, his loyalties
had switched camp altogether. He wrote La Pensée 68 with Luc Ferry,
later a Minister of  Education (2002-2004). The two political theorists
would explain Pensée 68 by noting that “[as] Marxism had already become
a dead ideology, we aimed to deconstruct the French variants of
Heideggerianism,” (HM 9), whose antisubjectivism they saw as a real
danger to cultivated democracy.61 Finding in the culture of  Heidegger
none of  the anti-technological-establishment-radicalism that had so
intrigued past readers, the authors rejected his “disciples” Foucault,
Bourdieu, Derrida and Lacan—ignoring more “obvious” targets like
Beaufret—as anti-modern and anti-democratic. La Pensee ‘68 polemically
charged that the Heideggerian “cult of  paradox” and “rejection of
clarity” provided the grounds for a cover-up of  contradictions inherent
in 1960s philosophical projects.62 And in doing so, the volume labeled
suspicious anything characterized by anti-positivism, linguistic
obliqueness, anti-subjectivism and especially the Heideggerian attempt
to overcome the reduction of  Being to presence.63 In early 1987, Ferry




Moreover, Ferry and Renaut were not the only ones insisting
on a new approach to philosophy and its political effects. Gilles
Lipovetsky’s L’Ere du vide constituted a rejection of  May ‘68 for its
“individualism”—as a politicophilosophical twist that should no longer
be taken seriously lest France degenerate into this very individualism.65
André Glucksmann’s 1987 Descartes, c’est la France,66 as its own title
suggests, read Descartes as synonymous with French modernity, and
argued that contemporary philosophical life was unthinkable without
him. Times were changing: even the radicalism of  the seemingly
unpolitical was shifting to the margins of  an intellectual playing field.
At the same time, Heidegger’s politics was being repeatedly
invoked as more dubious than once thought. In the 1983 Cahier de
l’Herne Jean-Michel Palmier, a conservative Germanist and longtime
Heidegger supporter, reported a comment by Heidegger to Jünger,
that he [Heidegger] would not apologize for his Nazism until Hitler
rose from the grave to apologize to him.67 In 1986, Löwith’s account
of  his meeting with Heidegger in Rome (when Heidegger spoke to
him of  the importance of  historicity in his engagement with the Nazis)
appeared in German and quickly reached France, raising the credibility
of  Löwith’s 1946 interpretation.68 Later used consistently to both support
and disprove the Farias line of  argument,69 the memoir joined other
phenomenologically-oriented readings of  Heidegger’s troubled politics.
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe published two essays on Heidegger’s politics
in his 1986 Imitations des Modernes: Typographies II, in which he made no
secret of  his debt and strong opposition to the master.70 Lacoue-
Labarthe rejected Heidegger’s search for origins as politically problematic
and his contempt for imitation as characteristic of  cultural conservatism.
All these texts signaled change: “Eclipse or decline? Difficult to say…”
lamented Palmier in 1986.71
Nineteen Eighty-Seven
1987 brought home the implications and importance of  the
gradual intellectual shifts regarding Heidegger, most forcefully through
the Heidegger debate that started with the publication of  Victor Farias’
Heidegger et le Nazisme. Notwithstanding the debate, the year was a prolific
one for Heidegger studies, as France witnessed the publication of  at
least 15 books on him even before publishers took up the Farias effect.72
Significantly, the Heidegger Affair was neither the only nor the most
important debate of  the year concerning the memory and horrors of
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National Socialism, but only one of  three major controversies, together
with the excruciating Klaus Barbie trial (which ended in July with the
conviction of  the “Butcher of  Lyon” for crimes against humanity),
and the famous and continuing debate over Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah.
As if  these large debates were not enough, the publications of  Mircea
Eliade’s unrepentant memoirs, Paul de Man’s collaborationist writings,
and Beaufret’s letters of  support to the notorious Holocaust revisionist
Robert Faurisson alarmed sentiment against positions that could be
seen as turning a blind eye to fascism. In this context, the knee-jerk,
neurotic character of  the fury that encompassed print media (even
television73) over Heidegger is remarkable but unsurprising.74 Previous
debates combined well with the intellectual tendency to loudly denounce
those assenting to the unacceptable and this time, la trahison des clercs
seemed all-inclusive. Thus, an affair that would normally be contained
in academic circles had students quitting courses upon hearing
“Heidegger”75 and newspapers writing “Being is hitleric. It’s Time that
this was demonstrated.”76
“Heil Heidegger!” cried Libération in a two-paged article on
October 16. The announcement carried a large rendition of  the now-
famous portrait of  Heidegger bearing the Hitler moustache and Nazi
insignia on his lapel, as well as an image of  him in a meeting of  “Rectors
for German Science.”77 Noting that Victor Farias’ Heidegger et le Nazisme
showed “conclusively” the extent of  Heidegger’s Nazism, the article
set the tone for much of  the early debate by asking “is it possible to
remain a Heideggerian?”78 Announced a month earlier by its preface’s
author, former nouveau-philosophe Christian Jambet,79 the well-anticipated
appearance of  the volume in mid-October sparked off  a series of
articles and essays, the majority of  which indicted not only Heidegger
but more or less anyone attached to his thought as intellectually
dangerous. Even Roger-Pol Droit’s sober review in Le Monde, which
preceded the article in Libération, argued that it was perhaps impossible
to continue working on Heidegger along past lines.80 The question was
not new, but as a problem it had seemed secondary after Beaufret and
Axelos’ 1960s championing of  Heidegger as the philosopher resolutely
fighting against both grand and quotidian totalitarianisms in search of
a philosopher’s utopia. As is well known, the critique of  subjectivity
had served as a ground for Foucault’s historical epistemology in the
first part of  L’archeologie du savoir, Derrida’s deconstruction, and even
the New Left imagination tied to the 1957-62 journal Arguments (a
thinking that survived the journal).81 Louis Althusser’s references to
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the Holzwege pointed in the same direction.82 The French New Left,
which built on the Hegelian Marxism pioneered by Jean Hyppolite,
Eric Weil, Alexandre Kojève, and others, was perhaps the most widely
(and, in general, least dogmatically) accepted of  Heidegger’s French
children during the 1960s—though it no longer formed a major
philosophical tendency and was largely ignored in the affair.83
With Farias, the question suddenly changed: if  Heidegger had
been an extreme, unrepentant Nazi, how could one overlook the
totalitarian undertones that could be found in his work? What was this
remnant of  the sixties, the gauche heideggerienne, if  not an absurdity? Did
not Heidegger’s restructuring of  subjectivity and his anti-humanist
existentialism hide a contempt for man and society similar to that of
the Nazis? Farias showed, relying on East Berlin archives but also on
Guido Schneeberger’s 1961 Nachlese zu Heidegger and Hugo Ott’s recent
research, that Heidegger had not just been erratically involved with the
Nazis during the Rectorate (VF 16). Farias proceeded to argue that
Heidegger was not just a tainted philosopher but a theorist of  the
SturmAbteilung, the Nazi brownshirts.84 As this theory “explained”
Heidegger’s own note that he had completely broken with the Nazi
elite after June 1934 (as June 30th, 1934, the “Night of  Long Knives”
marked the obliteration of  the SA),85 it found the German thinker
committed to a thuggish fascism from his early writings until his death
(VF 202-8, FHW 278). Had the treatment of  Heidegger’s political past
by his partisans been less tendentious, Farias’ book would have at best
ended on the shelves of  libraries.86 His interpretation was problematic,
refusing to read the philosophical dimension to Heidegger’s works and
resting on arguments that any competent interpreters of  Heidegger
have seen as laughable. Notoriously, Farias blew out of  context and
proportion two tributes that Heidegger had paid in the beginning and
end of  his public life to the virulently Anti-Semitic eighteenth-century
monk Abraham à Santa Clara, celebrated by Heidegger’s mother city
Meßkirsch.87 Farias ignored Heidegger’s ostensible unwillingness to echo
Abraham’s Anti-Semitism (in 1987 there were virtually no signs of
Heidegger’s own 1930s Anti-Semitism) and also ignored the context
of  Heidegger’s texts—Heidegger wrote the first one in seminary at the
age of  eighteen—and spent three times more space on these texts
than on Sein und Zeit.88 The ensuing interpretation of  Abraham as a
cornerstone in Heidegger’s thought flowed rather too easily.
What was widely accepted was Farias’ research, which rendered
the Beaufretian defense (that Heidegger had been an occasional Nazi
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in 1933-4, had quickly realized his error and had rejected it) unsustainable,
and even pro-Nazi. In the media event, “Heidegger” turned into a
signifier of  evil, an influence whose attraction hid dangers of  a Faustian
deal with Nazism. This was, in part, a consequence of  sources cited by
Farias that, though long in publication, remained outside mainstream
attention. A more serious reception of  Schneeberger’s Nachlese zu
Heidegger would have alleviated most of  the shock, but it remained
untranslated and had even been rejected in Critique by François Fédier
as “malignant” during the heyday of  Heideggerian orthodoxy.89 The
effect of  Farias’ book on a reading public aware of  Heidegger’s fame,
ambivalent toward poststructuralism, and keen on absolving itself  of  a
problematic past, was unsurprisingly violent. Writings in papers and
magazines quickly turned into tracts willing to indict Heidegger and
close his case, as the scandal in its early stages operated more as a one-
way street than a discussion.90
The first direct response came from Jacques Derrida,91 in an
interview which he later called premature.92 Derrida noted that Farias
was incompetent in reading Heidegger and offered little new material;
Jambet’s preface was a “hodgepodge,” a “Franco-French, not to say
provincial, operation… comic and sinister” (HPH 187).93 While agreeing
that Heidegger’s Nazism was not coincidental, Derrida turned the tables
to ask:
why deny that so many “revolutionary,” audacious, and
troubling works of  the 20th century have ventured into or
even committed themselves to regions that, according to
a philosophy which is confident of  its liberal and leftist-
democratic humanism, are haunted by the diabolical?
(HPH 182)
Already under fire for the collaborationist, Anti-Semitic writings of his
late friend Paul de Man, Derrida pointed somewhat hastily to his own
distance from Heidegger, saying that he had shown his reservations in
each of  his references to Heidegger, “as far back as they go” (HPH
183). Derrida insisted that deconstruction was neither reducible to
Heideggerianism nor amounted to a methodology resting on
Heideggerian foundations. In support of  this response, he pointed to
his own De l’esprit that was about to be published, following his lecture
at the Heidegger: questions ouvertes conference from March 1987. Farias
responded to Derrida’s interview by pointing to his own research,
implying that Derrida just couldn’t face the facts.94 The latter responded
in turn, noting that “anyone interested in Heidegger” had known, for
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decades even, certain facts that Farias was pointing out as new. For
Derrida, none of  the new facts changed Heidegger’s political disaster,
which Derrida saw himself  as having analyzed throughout his intellectual
life, and against which he continued to call for a deconstructive analysis
of  “all Nazisms” in Heidegger’s texts (hence implicitly granting a central
anti-Heideggerian demand).95 Read in context, Derrida’s quick response
did not serve him well. Press debates often present their public with
binary oppositions, and this one at first pitted Farias against Derrida.
As he was the first to confront Farias’ book and claimed that there was
nothing new to it, Derrida unwillingly picked up the mantle of  the
apologist—an apologist that he had certainly never been. He then aligned
himself  with (what we might call) French phenomenology, referring to
Levinas, Blanchot, and Lacoue-Labarthe—whom he saw as influenced
by Heidegger and as having confronted his politics (HPH 182). But
the interview did not suffice to suggest that he was taking a position
against both partisans and detractors: sporting a photograph of  him in
fashionably defiant pose, Le Nouvel Observateur presented Derrida as a
public dancer for Heideggerian apologetics. Even his expression of
reservations backfired, suggesting dishonesty on his part: how could
he deny the importance of  Farias while only now publicly presenting
political reservation? A subsequent exchange with Farias only
exacerbated this feeling, indirectly granting Ferry and Renaut precisely
the ground they required to repeat their attack.96
Much more explicitly apologetic positions were offered in
January 1988, in a compendium in Pierre Nora’s journal Le Débat.
François Fédier, Henri Crétella, Michel Deguy and Pierre Aubenque
all repeated versions of  the Beaufret argument, arguing that Farias’
book was not a reliable guide to Heidegger but only an example of
“the mediocrities’ assault” on him.97 The issue had been analyzed in
the past, their argument went, and it was high time that this be put
aside to let “serious work” based on Heidegger continue.98 Most
importantly among them, Fédier argued that Farias’ book was useless
because of  its “harmful intention” to identify Heidegger with Nazism.99
Fédier tried to disqualify this intention, partly by pointing out that two
German publishers had rejected Heidegger et le nazisme before it was
published in France, partly by denouncing “errors” in the
interpretation.100 Fédier soon also published a book-length analysis of
Farias in a book of  his own, Heidegger: anatomie d’un scandale. Fédier’s
book (no less of  a diatribe than Farias’) aimed again at errors in Farias’
text, often deciding what amounts to a mistake via a juxtaposition of
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Farias and Heidegger’s remarks and an obvious partiality toward the
latter.101 Through a hyperbolic reprise of  the Beaufret line of  defense—
though almost without mention of  Beaufret—Fédier claimed to show
that these mistakes disfigured the story and were nothing but
“calumnies” intended to stop others from thinking about the master.102
Like other Heideggerians, Fédier had a very serious point,
and to a great degree helped show the weakness of  Farias’ claims—yet
due to both his own partisanship and his methodological limitations,
they did not manage to overcome or even seriously counter the Farias
effect. Indeed the attempt to buttress a defense by using the Beaufret
line was badly received. Two sympathetic letters of  Beaufret to the
revisionist historian Robert Faurisson from 1979 had recently been
published in Faurisson’s journal, implying that Beaufret had also been
a revisionist.103 There is little indication in the letters that Beaufret echoed
the very ferocity of  Faurisson’s own 1980s revisionism, but the event
was not without precedents. In 1986 Emmanuel Martineau lamented
in an interview that with the passing of  time, Beaufret’s politics had
moved with increasing speed toward the extreme right.104 And, more
recently, Dominique Janicaud has reported a small “Beaufret affair” at
the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1968,105 where Roger Laporte apparently
told Derrida of  anti-Semitic comments by Beaufret, to whom Laporte
had been close. Derrida was concerned, insofar as his “Ousia and
Grammé” was being published in a Festschrift for Beaufret.106 Having
already expressed doubts—he was neither among Beaufret’s students
nor felt himself  close to them—Derrida approached a no less shocked
Maurice Blanchot, but Beaufret fiercely denied all this in an argument
with Laporte in Derrida’s office. Derrida and Blanchot left their essays
in the volume, asking Plon to publicize their discomfort (HF 2:99). By
1987, his role in the resistance now forgotten, Beaufret’s problematic
post-war politics rendered reference to him (even among some in his
closer circles) suspicious. It was probably for this reason that Fédier
sought not to compound difficulties and almost never cited Beaufret’s
texts in support of  Heidegger.107
Humanisms, Antihumanisms, Modernities
If  the immediate affair produced a rather harsh dichotomy,
its effect in a broader context was much more interesting. “In France,
a sky has fallen… le ciel des philosophes,” remarked biographer Hugo Ott,
viewing the difficulties facing those who stuck to Heidegger’s side.
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Orthodoxy was no longer convincing, and the position inspired by
Heidegger’s work that survived the debate was not at all Heideggerian
in spirit. The two most notable avant la lettre responses to Farias were
two books by Lacoue-Labarthe108 and Derrida,109 both of  which had
been in the making for a number of  years and were published shortly
after Farias’ own. Neither of  these works was supportive of  Heidegger;
instead, each treated significant aspects of  his thought as dishonest
and politico-philosophically worrying. The two texts were not
Heideggerian responses to Farias in the first place,110 but aimed at a
“third” position, that of  a Heidegger-inspired antihumanism that made
considerable use of  the thought of  Levinas and Maurice Blanchot,
and differed considerably from both Heideggerians and anti-
Heideggerians.111 It might be unfair to indiscriminately place the two
books,—in addition to the positions of  others, like Levinas—under
the same mantle. Their modes of  argumentation are different, their
conclusions even more so. Yet both reject fundamental Heideggerian
principles, while specifically retaining Heidegger’s critique of
Enlightenment humanism, two aspects that distinguish them from
orthodox Heideggerian arguments, which continued to accept
Heidegger’s oeuvre in toto without paying particular attention to the
antihumanist question.
In fact, both Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe insist on this
question. Their arguments see Europe as a dark continent of  political/
politicized philosophy, in which systems of  thought and engagement
are fundamentally influenced by unsavory political linkages, and where
humanism can offer no more than the illusion that one stands on better
ground than one’s adversaries.112 Hence, the “contaminated”
metaphysical and cultural realms of  Europe could not claim conclusive
opposition to its horrors. “Though not all positions and forms of
complicity are equivalent,” for Derrida “they are irreducible” (OS 40).
And even if, far from any desert, [Nazism] had grown like a
mushroom in the silence of a European forest, it would have
done so in the shadow of big trees, in the shelter of  their
silence or their indifference, but in the same soil … In their
bushy taxonomy, they would bear the names of religions,
philosophies, political regimes, economic structures, religious
or academic institutions. In short, what is just as confusedly
called culture, or the world of spirit.113
Derrida then reads Nazism as a metaphysical choice among others.
Ultimately, it was one’s “ascription” to any metaphysical choice that
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enabled and even appointed a politics as disastrous as Nazism. Spirit
provides here the crucial terminological problem—as it evokes, at once,
Hegel and certain conservative and nationalist political claims of
considerable significance for 1930s Germany. For Derrida, the early
Heidegger had considered Geist (spirit) a metaphysical proposition to
be overcome—Sein und Zeit only retained it in quotation marks (OS 1;
ch. 3,4). At this point, Derrida already argued against the use of  the
term in quotation marks, noting that through them, Heidegger, despite
his reservations, offered at least hospitality to its meaning (OS 24, 27-
9). But in Heidegger’s Rectoral Address of  1933 and his Introduction to
Metaphysics of  1935, and marking his crucial turn toward Nazism,
Heidegger put the quotation marks aside, and made the restoration of
German “Spirit” the centerpiece of  his engagement with and
expectation from Nazism (OS ch.5-6). This introduces Derrida’s
underlying “argument,” namely that Heidegger identified with National
Socialism on the basis of  his embrace of  a spiritual revolution against
the decadence of  the European spirit. Heidegger attempted the spiritual
rejuvenation of  Germany through Nazism without recognizing that, by
retreating from his earlier destructive analytic, he plunged into the very
metaphysics he wanted to overcome. In seeking the “spiritual”
rejuvenation of  Germany, its university, and Europe as a whole,
Heidegger’s program became “entangled with the worst.” A care for
the German Spirit thus links a personal to a philosophical politics.
Thus, Heidegger became an accomplice to the metaphysical nihilism
that he nominally opposed, a nihilism Derrida also discerned in other
motifs of  his thought, such as his treatments of  animality and evil (OS
47-57, 80). In speaking the language of  spirit, Heidegger convinced
himself  of  standing apart from the worst in Nazism—racialism,
biologism etc—all the while sheltering its basic foundations. Only in
1953, in his analysis of  Trakl, did Heidegger try to return to the analytic
that he had abandoned in 1933.114
This was not a new vein of  Derrida’s reading of  Heidegger—
his ambivalence is visible already from the mid-60s. But from the mid-
80s on, Derrida’s work concentrated increasingly on political prolems
(e.g. nationalism), while also moving toward an increasingly vocal critique
of  Heidegger115 without disavowing its dependence on him.116 In Of
Spirit, Derrida was both philosophically critical of  and contemptuous
toward Heidegger, calling his personal and intellectual behavior
“mediocre and hideous” (OS 121n.1). But at the same time, Derrida
denounced the intent to “burn” Heidegger—hence the book’s repeated
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references to fire and ash, as well as to Helvetius, who saw his own Of
Spirit denounced and burned.117 Derrida played with a motif  of  “too
late,” pointing out that it was perhaps too late to make a difference
regarding Heidegger’s Nazism. More provocatively for the mid-1980s,
he compared Heidegger’s discourse on the destitution of  the spirit to
works of  Edmund Husserl and Paul Valery, thinkers traditionally read
as opponents and victims of  fascism. Though they did not support
fascism, such “victims,” Derrida noted, were no less exclusionary when
struggling against a “destitution of  European spirit.” Instead, they took
a position analogous to Heidegger’s, a position that contemporary
humanism avoided challenging (OS 60-2).118
Lacoue-Labarthe’s approach often echoes Derrida’s but takes
pains to locate itself  closer to Levinas and Blanchot. Throughout the
1980s, Lacoue-Labarthe’s engagement with Heidegger included an
analysis of  Heidegger’s effect on Celan as well as a close reading of
Heidegger’s Rectoral Address.119 Still more critical toward Heidegger than
Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe argued that the Nazi engagement was
anticipated in Heidegger’s earlier writing and continued throughout his
life, albeit not in terms of  direct political engagement.120 Like Derrida,
Lacoue Labarthe treated the Rectoral Address as central to Heidegger’s
philosophical oeuvre, and extended this critical approach to suggest that
“only Heidegger allows us to understand National Socialism” (FP 72).
He also expressly criticized orthodox Heideggerians “for completely
missing the point,” especially as regards utterances that they “endlessly”
repeated, such as Heidegger’s 1955 claim, at Cérisy,121 that “there is no
Heideggerian philosophy.”122 Lacoue-Labarthe took seriously
Heidegger’s claim that his work represents an attempt to reach “pure
thought,” but, in a turn that would have pleased Adorno, used it to
show that this attempt at purity is inextricably linked to Heidegger’s
Nazism.123 Beyond the fundamental problems of  Being and Time,
especially the “question of  Being” (which Lacoue-Labarthe accepts as
fairly unproblematic [FP 25]), Heidegger’s work appeared to him a
philosophy deeply immersed in political arguments, especially in when
it was involved in seemingly harmless analyses of  poetry and techné.
Relying on Levinas’ assault on ontology as forever bearing with it power
and violence (for instance, in De l’existence à l’existant), as well as on
Derrida’s critiques of  Heidegger’s supposed antihumanism, Lacoue-
Labarthe argued that, like many others, Heidegger found nothing in
the Old World with which to resist “the irruption of  the so-called
“New World,” and no reason to evade the challenge which presented
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itself  in Nazism” (FP 43). For Lacoue-Labarthe, this was the gist of
Heidegger’s Nazism, an arche-fascism readable as national aestheticism
especially in his supposed resurrection of  “a Greece which never really
saw the light of  day.”124 Heidegger not only heralded a “caesura” with
the recent past but retained it long after his recognition of  Nazism’s
disinterestedness in a rejuvenation of  Being.125 Hence, the “inner truth
and greatness” of  national aestheticism stayed with Heidegger well
beyond the 1930s: Lacoue-Labarthe’s concerns with the originary, “the
model,” “the will itself ” and poetry, thus turned against Heidegger’s
MetaGreece,126 claiming it was Heidegger’s national aestheticism that
facilitated his greatest political failure, namely to think the Holocaust.127
Insofar as the debate was concerned, Lacoue-Labarthe also argued
that Heidegger neither was the only Nazi nor belonged to the worst,
and rejected the anti-Heideggerian attempts to “burn” Heidegger as
ludicrous (FP 178-80).128
A similar argument also formed part of  Jean-François Lyotard’s
Heidegger and “The Jews,” published later in the year, which attempted to
set rules for the political debate and considered the insufficiency of
Heidegger’s postwar role in the examination of  issues raised by the
Holocaust. While sharing many of  Lacoue-Labarthe and Derrida’s
presuppositions, Lyotard argued against Lacoue-Labarthe’s
understanding of  the Holocaust as a “caesura” in Western history and
his treatment of  “‘national aestheticism.”129 For Lyotard, these concepts
allowed Lacoue-Labarthe to poeticize aspects of  the Holocaust but in
the end failed to explain it.130 Concluding mostly in favor of  Heidegger,
Lyotard supported the critical dimension in Derrida and Lacoue-
Labarthe, positing another critical explanation of  Heidegger’s silence
on the Holocaust.131
During the 1987 debate, Derrida’s and especially Lacoue-
Labarthe’s Heidegger-inspired antihumanism was generally represented
in Le Nouvel Observateur, which, in addition to Derrida’s November
interview, included a dossier on Heidegger in January.132 The introduction
to the articles had few kind words for Fédier, characterizing him as a
credo-follower, “extra-dry and non-defrocked.”133 Instead, figures such
as Levinas, Blanchot and Gadamer argued in these pages that the
“Heidegger affair” had not really changed their opinion of  Heidegger,
which had always been critical of  his failings, especially of  the failure
“to think the Apocalypse of  Auschwitz.” The gesture of  rejecting Fédier
is a symptom of  major importance in their effort to show that not
everything that had come from Heidegger could be characterized as
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Heideggerian. Conversing with each other,134 their texts rejected the
present trial of  Heidegger, “conducted by the card-carrying anti-
Heideggerians,” as impertinent and intellectually dishonest.135 Instead,
the “refusal” or “failure” to think Auschwitz became a central claim
among these thinkers as well as Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe—and
this dossier was its clearest exposition. In what might be dubbed the
College International de Philosophie/Nouvel Observateur approach of  the
debate, the dossier (and the books by Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe)
offered a clear political and philosophico-political understanding of
the distance of  French phenomenological and post-phenomenological
thought from both Heideggerians and detractors.136 This argument,
veering between a delicate Heidegger-inspired antihumanism and a
qualitative surpassing of  Enlightenment humanism, claimed its
superiority through a more disillusioned reading of  the century, a more
careful contextualization of  philosophy, and a more consistent
engagement with ethics. Specifically, this position took up in the debate
a thinking of  the Shoah as the Apocalypse, which it combined with
mourning for the failure of  “the pinnacle of  Western thought,”
Heidegger, to think and think against this catastrophe, which they
regarded as “the revelation of  the essence of  the West.”137
On the other end of  the spectrum regarding an intellectual
conception of  modernity and Heidegger’s philosophical importance
stood a new book by Ferry and Renaut, published in early 1988 as
Heidegger and Modernity. In part a polemical intellectual history against
French phenomenological thought and in part an discussion of
connections between modernity and humanism, the volume continued
the authors’ effort to restore meaning to humanism in an explicitly
Sartrean manner (HM 3). Insofar as the debate was concerned, Ferry
and Renaut saw their earlier campaign contra Heidegger proven right
by Farias (HM 9, 67-72) and took up a particularly hostile tone against
Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe.138 In an anecdotal public-philosophical
idiom, they took issue with the work of  both, especially with a seemingly
minor supposition of  Lacoue-Labarthe, that “Nazism is a humanism
insofar as it rests on a definition of  humanitas which it sees as more
powerful and effective than any other” (FP 138). Echoing Heidegger
and Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe had rejected the universality of
humanism and the ahistorical claims of  its present adherents regarding
its eternal value and righteousness as well as its simple, binary opposition
to “antihumanism.” Ferry and Renaut objected that this was an
essentialist definition of  humanism, in other words, that Derrida and
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his students’ “misunderstood” (a) Nazism as exemplary of  a certain
modernity, and (b) humanism as a reflection on the essence of  the
subject.139 Heidegger did not become a Nazi because through an excess
of  metaphysical humanism, they suggested, but because of  a dearth
thereof  (FHW 294-5). Ferry and Renaut’s universalist liberal humanism
(HM 192-3) hinged at this point on a rather crude identification of
Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe with a radical conservative anti-modernist
illiberalism (HM 71-3, 155-8).140 What they could not accept was
Heidegger’s rejection of  humanism as part and parcel of  a modernity
inclusive of  Nazism, Stalinism and American individualism (all of  them
widely seen in the French intellectual scene as the exemplary evils of
the late 1940s). For them, it was the rejection of  the human as tainted
that was to be rejected if  one were to become Heidegger’s shepherd of
Being. 141
A similar position was invoked in the republication in book
form of  Bourdieu’s 1975 article L’ontologie politique de Martin Heidegger in
early 1988. In an interview with Libération, Bourdieu took Derrida to
task over De l’esprit, suggesting that Derrida was building on his
(Bourdieu’s) earlier work and had been put in a particularly difficult
position by Farias’ book.142 By this point it was March 1988 and Derrida,
tired of  defending himself  over his alignments with de Man and
Heidegger, fired back an angry letter, arguing that Bourdieu’s “told-
you-so” interview included factual inaccuracies (that Derrida had
accepted without concern Bourdieu’s analysis) and was, as an analysis
of  Heidegger, “radically insufficient”.143 He noted, objecting to
Bourdieu, that he was under no particular pressure because the vigilance
of  his readings of  Heidegger confirmed his non-solidarity with
Heidegger’s engagement. While Bourdieu was arguably more influenced
by Heidegger than he allowed, what was significant in his participation
in the debate was the impression he and Libération insistently gave,
namely that an honestly leftist position had to now confront its debt to
Heidegger and reject him. Given that a certain “second-hand” Heidegger
had been important to the Hegelian and Althusserian strands of  French
Marxism in the 60s and 70s, and also his rejection from a strictly left-
leaning political world confirmed the new distance between
Heideggerianism and the remnants of  that left—even its “popular”
non-specialist strands. Interestingly enough, the position of  Renaut,
Ferry, Bourdieu and Libération, was occasionally not that far from the
position staked by Derrida, Lyotard and Lacoue-Labarthe (the C.I.P.
view). Both sides rejected Heideggerians for sanitizing the Nazi past;
STEFANOS GEROULANOS
48
both rejected Heideggerian utopias, whether these concerned Dasein
itself, MetaGreece or the task of  poetry. But the two positions differed
on the importance of  humanism in liberal democracy. Remaining within
the critique first established by the Letter on Humanism and later
transformed by (among others) Derrida’s “Ends of  Man,” Derrida,
Lacoue-Labarthe, Blanchot and Levinas rejected critics’ classical
metaphysical humanism as insufficient. Ferry and Renaut, on the other
end, understood phenomenological antihumanism as a clause of  a world
surpassed, and implicitly rejected the older connection between anti-
humanism and the intellectual left, forged during the 1950s by the
Letter on Humanism, Beaufret, the Arguments group, and the Kojèvian
legacy as an antimodernism dedicated to obstructing liberal hopes.
Aftermath
The debate continued until the middle of  1988: journals
continued to publish dossiers regarding “the truth about Heidegger”
well into June, while mini-debates in the press continued until at least
March.144 Heidegger’s name and legacy was indeed marred—but to
what extent? Certain effects became quickly noticeable. First, the
prodigious amount of  writing on Heidegger was somewhat reduced.
Between 1989 and 2000, France saw the publication of  about 100
books on the subject of  Heidegger, fewer than the mid-eighties trend
of  publications would suggest but nevertheless a most substantial
corpus. Few philosophers continue to interpret the world from the
strict perspective of  such Heideggerian fundamentals as a MetaGreece
of  poetic thinking. For a while, claims to be working in ontology
routinely demanded political clarifications and a taking of sides: in his
first footnote to Being and Event, published in 1988, Alain Badiou included
a discussion of  his distance from both orthodox Heideggerians and
their humanist critics.145 Nevertheless, though the strict, uncritical French
following of  Heidegger came largely to an end, it is premature to
conclude, with Ferry and Renaut (and to a certain degree with
Rockmore’s pessimism), that Heidegger is finished in France. In the
very least, phenomenologians and philosophers deeply indebted to
Heidegger continued to hold very significant positions.146 In 2003, in
another major institutional “success,” Heidegger became an established
part of  the questions for the agrégation en philosophie. Moreover, as noted
already, the post-‘87 corpus of  works is significant and, for the most
part, adequately informed by the problem of  Heidegger’s Nazism. A
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generation of  younger, somewhat more critical if  still deeply indebted
philosophers has taken up the space left open by the Heideggerians’
collapse, approaching him through a more careful perspective and often
centering on his very early work. It is also too soon to assess if  a relative
decline of  Heidegger’s influence, in favor of  the more recent turns
toward philosophies of  life (notably toward Bergson and Deleuze)
and, especially, the turn toward analytic and post-analytic philosophy—
is either of  long-term significance or related to the political question.
In the 1990s, the major orthodox Beaufretians remained Fédier
and Vezin (both of  them outside the university). Fellow travelers like
Frédéric de Towarnicki, Walter Biemel and Roger Munier took up a
more contemplative, lamenting tone in their later work, publishing
mémoirs rather than analyses.147 Fédier’s own essay collection Regarder
Voir, his album of  photographs,148 and his Gallimard translation of
Heidegger’s political texts149 further adopted a melancholic apologetics
which suggests a lack of  comfort in the intellectual domain, and a
continuing feeling that a media event such as the 1987 affair stopped
work that had more to offer. In a sense, Fédier’s own (and often
disagreeable) argument that Heidegger’s choice of  Nazism as the only
“honest” option available to him in 1933 in the late 1990s has not
substantially helped his defense.150 Anti-Heideggerianism has also
continued, though without the intensity built up in the 80s. While neo-
humanism became politically popular and a significant intellectual force,
it is not unfair to claim that the popular success of its philosophical
impulse was not accompanied by a major academic rise and has resulted
in much hostility among philosophers who saw neo-humanism as a
rejection of  twentieth-century trends in toto. The most important anti-
Heideggerian arguments to be published during the 1990s were Henri
Meschonnic’s Le Langage Heidegger, Jean-Pierre Faye’s Le Piège, both of
which see the Farias events in positive light (Meschonnic especially).151
Le Piège is the latest of  Faye’s attempts to explain the problem that
Heidegger poses for contemporary thinkers, and consists mostly of  a
repetition of earlier work resonating well with the Libération-led disavowal
of  Heidegger and situating him squarely in the middle of  Le Langage
Meurtier, a new version of  his classic Langages Totalitaires. Meschonnic’s
more extensive treatment attempts to eject Heidegger from linguistics
and poetry: weaving his argument around the 1987 affair, Meschonnic
argues that Heidegger understood little of  poetry and that his language,
right down to the poetry it claims to authentically reinterpret, remains
deeply flawed.152 The publication of  Heidegger’s texts and courses from
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the 1930s also provoked occasional debates.153 Towering over these
was the 2005 publication of  Emmanuel Faye’s Heidegger: l’introduction du
nazisme dans la philosophie, which brought an especially harsh interpretation
of  Heidegger’s politics and philosophy and has maintained a certain
pressure: the very subtitle of  the book (“The Introduction of  Nazism
into Philosophy”) speaks clearly to the rejection of  Heidegger sought
by Faye.154 Faye’s argument, which includes readings of  Heidegger’s
especially disconcerting courses from his time as Rector and the
aftermath of  this tenure has been particularly significant and visible as
a criticism of  French thought, particularly as Faye argues that Heidegger
subjected philosophy to National Socialism’s goals and tropes, and that
a rejection of  his thought is necessary for the rehabilitation and de-
nazification of  philosophy. Following the publication of  Faye’s book,
a new and broad debate erupted, notably on the internet and even on
television,155 with a first response by Fédier and others coming by way
of  an email manifesto.156 In early 2007, a number of  thinkers around
Fédier extended this response to a book-length response to Faye,
Heidegger à plus forte raison, once again aiming to prevent the political
criticisms of  Heidegger from turning into a wholesale philosophical
rejection of  Heidegger’s thought.157
What is missing in the present debate, even though the evidence
is far more politically damning than was Farias’ stilted synthesis, and
even though is the neohumanist fervor of  the 1980s, which transformed
the problem of  how to interpret and deal with Heidegger’s politics
into a cause célèbre against the “philosophy of  the 1960s.” Faye does
argue against the French Heideggerian influence, but without a clear
philosophical alternative. Recent debates in the press (particularly around
questions of  eugenics and anti-Semitism), have more or less allowed
an acceptance of  Heidegger as a Nazi and as an at least mild anti-
Semite without denying the significance and influence of  his thought.158
Moreover, for the first time in 2006, Heidegger became one of  the two
major philosophers to be examined in the French philosophical
agrégation—one of  the pillars of  academic respectability in France.159
The political question has also been a significant philosophical topic,
for example at the five-day conference at Strasbourg (Heidegger: le danger
et la promesse) in November-December 2004, which involved figures
such as Badiou, Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy, and Peter Sloterdijk.
Certain Heideggerians also presented more vocally their
distance from the cocoon. Jean-Michel Palmier, who had in 1945
brought Beaufret’s first letter to Heidegger and had cautiously defended
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Heidegger on the political issue by citing his distance from militants
like Ernst Krieck, published a long article treating most recent accounts
of  Heidegger’s politics as “plausible.”160 While retaining sympathy for
the classical Heideggerian thesis, Palmier argued that divergence of
opinion in the dispute undermined Heideggerian claims to a privileged
access of  the master’s text.161 Thinkers like Janicaud, Haar, Dastur,
Catherine Malabou, and Jean-François Courtine have continued (often
harsh) critiques of  Heidegger from within a broader phenomenological
and post-phenomenological viewpoint. Courtine wrote in 1990 that
Heidegger essentially distorts dialogue into monologue, occluding
difference, opposition and genuine exchange.162 And Dominique
Janicaud, who in 1963 had supported Heidegger without reservation163
conceded in L’Ombre de cette pensée164 the significance of  the political
problem. Janicaud located the extremist threat solidly within Heidegger’s
thought—though for him it was “the thought of  man’s finitude in
history and the radical historicity of  Dasein” that facilitated the
disastrous engagement (HF 1:388). In his last published work, Janicaud
provided the meticulous Heidegger en France, whose most interesting and
questionable positions concern his downgrading of  the major political
thematics regarding antihumanism and the Heideggerian left. It includes
a serious, frequently spirited defense of  deconstruction’s debt to
Heidegger, a defense that often underplays the anti-anthropological
and anti-subjectivist positions in Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe.
Meanwhile, Derrida’s “Levinasian” political or ethical turn has further
framed his critical analysis of  Heidegger. The most obvious notable
texts in this vein are his interview with Jean-Luc Nancy Apres le sujet qui
vient?165 and Apories, where Derrida argued against Heidegger’s
prescription of the “authentic” projection of oneself unto death.
Echoing Levinas’, Löwith’s, and Janicaud’s worry over the political
implications of  Heidegger-inflected finitude, Derrida argued the
impossibility of  thinking one’s own proper death: in accord with
Heidegger that death is the innermost possibility of  Dasein, that of  its
impossibility, Derrida countered, echoing the argument of  Bataille,
Blanchot and Levinas on the impossibility of  experiencing death, that
death is life’s “most ex-propriating [and] inauthenticating” dimension.166
In this context, effects of  the 1987 debate are discernable in
deconstruction’s heightened attention to questions of  ethics and religion,
which can be partly understood as a reaction to the neohumanist and
multiculturalist tendencies in French thought that Derrida repeatedly
criticized. The deaths of  Derrida in 2004 and Lacoue-Labarthe in 2007
STEFANOS GEROULANOS
52
(as well as of  Dominique Janicaud in 2001 and Maurice Blanchot in
2003) have left many of  these questions open or up for a different kind
of  development.
What were the stakes of  the 1987 Heidegger affair? Maybe it
is important to start with what these stakes were not. The collapse of
official Heideggerianism was itself  not of  primary importance. It
indicated that Heidegger’s name and oeuvre no longer form the basic
foundation of  a specific movement in French thought: most orthodox
Heideggerians had seen their influence decline in the intellectual milieu
since the 1960s, and the Farias affair further marginalized the
Beaufretians. Second, the debate surprisingly took on no questions
concerning the gauche heideggérienne during the third quarter of  the
century—though the Heideggerian Left was helped in its own decline
as well. With the emphasis on Nazism, the Heideggerian Left, which
had been extraordinarily important in the late 1960s, became not merely
a paradox but a contradiction. This affected the thought and present
political choices even of  figures like Derrida, and indicates a concern
by neohumanist critics to present Heidegger’s French offspring as
downright reactionaries, not as a part of  a problematic left. Similarly
not explicitly at stake in 1987 was the debt of  postmodernism in general
to Heidegger. Lyotard’s position in 1987-1988 had little to do with
“postmodernism,” while Baudrillard’s short media “necrology” of
Heidegger was quickly forgotten.167 Finally, Bourdieu’s contribution
against Heidegger measured against his debt to structuralism suggests
that the remnants of  structuralism were no longer a milieu in need of
overcoming.
Now for the importance of  the affair: if  French Heideggerians
had succeeded in the past in heroizing their master, this was largely
because they had appealed to a 1930s, 1950s and 1960s intellectual
public that conceived of  modernity as a battlefield of  ontological utopias
and was concerned with evading the embarrassing and over-optimistic
politics of  humanist partiality. The Heidegger affair showed how a
community of  readers that developed during the 1960s and supported
a widespread and not necessarily academic thinking during the period
was now evaporating—hence the difficult position that Derrida and
others were indeed brought to, including even Paul Ricoeur, hardly a
Heideggerian himself, who called the affair anti-French and anti-
philosophical.168 This has also affected and facilitated “resistance to
theory” and the appropriation of  French thought in U.S. academia—
often unfairly presented as a thinking “no longer alive” in France.
SLAUGHTERBENCH OF HUMANISMS
53
Parallel to deconstruction’s turn toward ethics and religion,
the rise of  Christian and religiously-inflected readings of  Heidegger in
France since the early 1980s (in the hands of  Jean-Luc Marion, for
example, not to mention Jean-Luc Nancy’s work, which has a more
complex and ambiguous relationship to both Heidegger and Christianity
than does Marion’s) can also be attributed to a certain decline of  the
atheist and antihumanist inspiration that Heidegger had offered since
the 1960s. Nancy has largely managed to steer his own dependency on
and critique of  Heidegger clear of  the debates.169 The problem with
this (in itself  philosophically valuable) development is that it excises
from contemporary thought one of  the most significant and elaborate
arguments for the epistemological and ontological significance of  anti-
foundationalism and philosophical atheism, hence contributing to a
re-ideologization of  philosophy that is no less troubling than the status
quo ante 1987.
At stake in 1987 was the dissipation of  that community by the
1980s development of  a rhetoric of  human rights and liberal democracy,
a rhetoric that in 1987 played out as the most significant counterpart to
strands of  thought (and the poststructuralist tradition) who instead,
without rejecting human dignity, did not use “human rights” to reject
dimensions of  a past that had not taken them as a fundamental premise.
Derrida was not the only thinker voicing concerns that this rhetoric,
especially in Ferry & Renaut’s terms, summarily excised from philosophy
significant questions and foreclosed a serious treatment of political
and philosophical legacies. Jambet, Ferry, Renaut and others argued
(rather too fast) for a dismantling of  past antimodernisms (anti-modern
standing in for anti-liberal) whose continuing role operates against the
future of  French philosophy, by blinding thinkers to the political
implications of  a philosophical world that had to be overcome.170 Their
opposition to a “thought of  68” was not just an attempt to render
philosophy politically agreeable by excising troubling origins but a
concern over the continuing import of  a thought that rejected the
fundamental premises and promises of  the Franco-European present.
Still, it is impossible to ignore the pamphleteering manner through
which Ferry and Renaut made their point, accepting liberalism’s name
and position without seriously locating it either in its troubled history
or even beyond it.
Ascending neo-humanism thus clashed with deconstruction
by treating the latter’s conception of  the subject as one that engaged in
a “facile” cosmopolitanism, but evaded the questions and potentials
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of  a liberal-democratic thinking. If  deconstruction’s subsequent
insistence on ethics and religion can be partly understood as a reaction
to the 1980s political charges against it, 1987-88 should be read as a
watershed that has led to more recent debates involving religion, ethics
and multiculturalism. As Franco-French (dit Derrida) as it was anti-
French (dit Ricoeur), the Heidegger affair forced a realignment of  fault-
lines and public divisions in French thought by emphasizing questions
on the rigor of  definitions of  humanism and the debts that trouble
philosophical innovation. 1987 was a debate that continues to influence
French thought today, if  not with direct concern over humanism, at
least under the continuing concerns with race and multiculturalism,
the connections to a dark twentieth century and the possible futures
of  liberal democracy.
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